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THE CITY AND THE SOUL: CHARACTER AND THRIVING IN
LAW AND POLITICS
Sherman J. Clark

ABSTRACT
This Article describes a way of thinking about law and politics that is ancient
in origins but largely absent from modern legal scholarship. It poses a two-part
question: how do our law and politics influence our character, and how does that
in turn influence how well and fully we live?
Much legal scholarship asks how law can be more efficient and effective in
making us richer, healthier, safer, and such. This is good: wealth, health, and
safety are—or can be—good things. But material conditions are not the only
things that make for a rich and full life. What also matters—and beyond a certain
threshold may matter much more—is what sort of people we are. If, for example,
we are wise and brave, we will likely live better and more fully than if we are
foolish and fearful. This much should be uncontroversial. What goes
unaddressed, however, is that law and politics, whether we like it or not, have an
impact on what sort of people we become. Granted, the impact is incremental and
marginal, but it may also be cumulative and substantial—just as an incremental
cumulative exposure to asbestos can lead to cancer. We can ignore it; but that does
not make it go away. We can claim that it is not the business of law to think about
character; but that is an irresponsible dodge.
This Article argues that we should acknowledge and take responsibility for the
impact our law and politics have on our character and thus on our capacity to
live well. To that end I describe several ways in which law and politics may
influence the sort of people we become. I then offer a way of thinking about what
traits and capacities may conduce to our thriving—as democratic citizens and
human beings. Just as a dose or two of poison every day can cause illness,
nutrition and exercise can build strength. If our law and politics inevitably have
some impact on the sort of people we become, as I argue they do, we should ask
whether and how we can nurture the strengths we need—for our city and our
souls.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, my aim is to describe and seek help in pursuing
an approach to law and politics grounded in the connection
between two things—character and thriving. By character I do not
mean simply general goodness, as the term is sometimes used.
Rather, I mean particular traits, capacities, and attitudes. By
thriving I do not mean simply happiness as studied by happiness
researchers or even positive psychology, although that research
may be useful. Rather, I use the term thriving to signal the need to
think about what conduces to or constitutes a good life. The term
also serves to highlight what we know to be true but in our law and
politics tend to ignore—that a rich and full life rests on more than
material goods and external circumstances. It rests, at least to some
extent—and in ways we should explore and acknowledge—on what
sort of people we are. And our law and politics, whether we like it
or not—whether we take responsibility for it or not—help make us
who we are.
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My claim, in a nutshell, is this: because law and politics may have
an impact on character, and character may impact thriving, law
and politics should pay attention to both what sort of people we
become and how that in turn impacts our capacity to thrive.
Character—what sort of people we are—greatly influences how
well and fully we are able to live. This is the operating premise in
much of classical ethics. Plato’s Socratic dialogues, for example,
are misunderstood when read as if they address primarily the
question of right and wrong, as modern ethics tends to conceive it.
Rather, the Socratic inquiry is essentially this: what sort of person
should we strive to become—what traits, capacities, and attitudes
should we nurture—if we hope to live fully and well? The classical
insight is that human thriving is largely a consequence of
character.
To this insight I join another—equally ancient but now often
ignored. Law and politics inevitably, albeit indirectly, influence
character. If, therefore, law and politics are to help us live well,
theorists and lawmakers should attend to the ways in which law and
politics indirectly make us who we are and thus influence our
capacity to thrive. Over the years, I have explored this way of
thinking in a series of papers addressing particular institutions and
1
2
practices including: the jury, direct democracy, criminal
3
4
5
procedure, legal argument, and legal education.
So far, however, I have failed to articulate a clear and coherent
theoretical framework for these inquiries—sometimes framing the
project as a form of virtue ethics, sometimes as a question of
community identity, and other times as a way of making sense of
legal doctrine. In particular, I have not clarified the distinction
between my essentially consequentialist approach and recent
normative theories of what has come to be called “virtue
jurisprudence.” I have also failed to respond adequately to the
concern that I am asking law and politics to do something
illegitimate. Whatever precisely I mean by character and thriving, it

1. Sherman J. Clark, The Juror, The Citizen, and The Human Being, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 421
(2014).
2. Sherman J. Clark, Ennobling Direct Democracy, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1341 (2007);
Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341 (2004).
3. Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB.
L. REV. 1258 (2003).
4. Sherman J. Clark, An Apology for Lawyers, 117 MICH. L. REV. 995 (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 1001) (draft available at https://michiganlawreview.org/classic-revisited-anapology-for-lawyers-socrates-and-the-ethics-of-persuasion/).
5. Sherman J. Clark, The Seventh Letter and the Socratic Method, U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
CAVEAT
(2015),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&
context=mjlr_caveat; Sherman J. Clark, Law School as Liberal Education, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235
(2013).
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sounds to many like something law and politics ought to stay out
of. Here, I hope to clarify and defend this way of thinking about
law and politics.
In Part I, I argue that the questions I raise have ancient roots
and are of contemporary significance. I also argue that it is
appropriate and legitimate for liberal democratic law and politics
to confront these questions. In Part II, I describe eight interrelated
ways in which law and politics may impact character. In Part III, I
argue briefly for a particular way of thinking about the impact of
character on thriving and for a set of eight interrelated traits we
might aim to nurture or at least not undercut.
These thoughts are offered in the spirit of illustration and
inquiry. Should readers disagree about the particular ways in which
law and politics may impact character and/or especially about the
particular traits law and politics ought to nurture, I will consider
this argument a success. That is exactly the sort of conversation I
hope to generate—a conversation about the ways in which law and
politics may make us who we are and thus impact how well and
fully we live.
I.

A NEW, OLD, AND UNAVOIDABLE QUESTION
A. The Uses of Virtue

The way of thinking I outline here is, to my knowledge, distinct
from any line of inquiry currently being pursued—at least in the
legal scholarly literature. The closest approach so far is recent
scholarship on “virtue jurisprudence,” which is sometimes
6
described as seeking “aretaic” theories of law. Recognizing the rise
or re-emergence during the second half of the Twentieth Century
of virtue ethics in philosophy, scholars have sought to apply the
insights of philosophical virtue ethics to law. They have, for
example, explored the question of what makes for a virtuous
7
8
judge, and for virtuous legal decision-making more broadly. They
have recognized that some form of human flourishing ought to be
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SOLUM, VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence
Solum eds., 2008); Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1170; Kyron
Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 465, 468 (2004); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423
(1995).
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SOLUM, JUDICIAL SELECTION: IDEOLOGY VERSUS CHARACTER, U.
SAN DIEGO PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 04-07 (2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=516585 (click “Download This Paper” for PDF of article).
8. See, e.g., SOLUM, supra note 6.

WINTER 2019]

The City and the Soul

421

an aim of or consideration in law and politics, and thus have
recognized the need for more encompassing theories of virtue and
9
law generally.
In a sense, therefore, the approach I advocate might be
described as building on the emerging virtue jurisprudence.
However, I am not here using conceptions of virtue or character to
judge or evaluate conduct. Nor am I addressing the question of
what traits are intrinsically good or morally right or constitutive of
human excellence. A fuller inquiry would tackle those questions.
In particular, a fuller account in the classical tradition would
recognize that some traits, capacities, and attitudes may be not
merely conducive to but also components of a rich and full life—ends
as well as means. I have views on some of those matters; but my
focus in this Article is narrower. My concern here is with the
instrumental value of traits and capacities. I am interested in the
extent to which the development of particular traits might help us
live well and fully.
I do not attempt here to specify the content of a good and full
life. Nor is it necessary to do so to think usefully about the role
character may play in helping us live well and fully. As I describe
below, some at least tentative account of what conduces to thriving is
necessary. That is why I am offering this account. But it is possible
to identify traits, capacities, and attitudes that are likely to help us
thrive according to very wide range of plausibly appealing visions
of human thriving. In the physical realm, health is useful in a wide
range of endeavors; strength can help you lift whatever you want to
lift; and clear vision is useful pretty much no matter what you want
to see.
So this Article asks two questions. What traits, capacities and
attitudes are like health, strength, and clear vision but for the soul
rather than the body? And what if anything can or should law and
politics do to help nurture those traits?

9. Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 Am. J. Juris. 65, 76 (2006) (“A complete
virtue jurisprudence would include a virtue-theoretic account of the ends of legislation, a
virtue-centered theory of judging, and an aretaic account of the nature of law.”); Chapin F.
Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 312
(2009) (“With time and attention, theorists will eventually uncover the specifics of the
theory’s potential impact on law.”); COLIN FARRELLY & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, An Introduction
to Aretaic Theories of Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 232 (“An aretaic theory
of legislation would naturally begin with the premise that the telos or proper end of law is
the promotion of human flourishing. If the purpose of law is to enable humans to acquire,
maintain, and exercise the human excellences or virtues, it seems likely that there will be
important implications for familiar debates.”).
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B. An Ancient Greek Problem
In a sense, it is ironic that I should struggle to frame this inquiry,
for it is not a new problem. It was, in fact, at the heart of the first
and still most provocative conversation about the city and the
10
soul—the conversation described in Plato’s Republic. And as old as
these questions are, equally old is the tendency to find them
difficult and challenging, and thus to take refuge in arguments
about justice or utility—as if such concerns could be somehow
isolated from the underlying questions of what makes for a good
life and the role played by law and politics in nurturing such a life.
Enter Cephalus; or rather exit Cephalus—for it is his departure
from which we can learn.
Cephalus is a character in Plato’s Republic—a prosperous old
11
man in whose home the long conversation occurs. He says that he
is concerned about two things—the same two things, in fact, that
are the subject of most legal scholarship. First, he hopes to provide
materially for those for whom he is responsible. Second, he wants
12
to behave justly. So, like modern legal academics and policymakers, Cephalus purports to care about both consequentialist and
deontological concerns. In addition, Cephalus says that he is eager
for argument about these matters, as he claims to desire thoughtful
13
conversation of the sort Socrates offers.
Socrates takes Cephalus at his word and starts a conversation. He
begins in his usual way—by calling into question the coherence of
14
Cephalus’s conventional understanding of justice. As we know,
the inquiry will ultimately involve and call into question an entire
set of assumptions on which Cephalus and those like him have
made sense of their lives and work.
But Cephalus is having no part of it. Before the conversation
even gets rolling—a conversation he claimed to have desired, on
matters in which he claimed to have keen interest—Cephalus
15
abruptly departs, saying that he must go see to the sacrifices. He is
unwilling, perhaps even unable, to see that questions of justice and
questions of utility are both incoherent absent an underlying
account of the relationship between politics (including law),
character (understood primarily as what one cares about and

10.
1991).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Plato, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., HarperCollins Publishers
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–7.
Id. at 7.
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pursues), and thriving (understood as not merely happiness but
eudaimonia).
My hope is to emulate those among Socrates’s interlocutors who
were willing to tackle—however tentatively and inconclusively—the
questions that Cephalus and others like him are so eager to duck.
C. A Contemporary American Problem
Nor are these questions of merely historical or theoretical
significance. The widespread discontent evident in contemporary
American politics no doubt has many causes; and many of those
causes are concrete. Economic insecurity and lack of opportunity
produce stress and undercut hope. Persistent and systemic racism
and discrimination frustrate and anger marginalized people; while
at the same time a sense of eroding privilege frightens and
unsettles those not yet quite at the margins. Widening income
inequality engenders resentment. Terrorism and violence create
fear and insecurity. All of these are to some extent failures of
governance. Law and politics have not responded adequately to
these and other concrete difficulties. And people are not happy
about it.
I suggest here, however, that there is also a deeper failure at
work. We have failed to address the question of what people really
need. We seem to act on the implicit assumption that maximizing
material goods will conduce to well-being. But we may well be
mistaken. Granted that a certain level of certain material goods—
health, wealth, safety, and the like—is necessary or at least useful to
human thriving, it is another thing entirely to behave as though we
believe those are the only things that matter. We have massive
bodies of work devoted to thinking about how to meet material
needs—for wealth, health, security, and the like. Yet we seem
persistently unwilling to think about whether and how we might
nurture the deeper things people may need if they are to thrive
and be happy. This, I argue here, is our deepest and most
dangerous failure.
One possible partial corrective to this mistake would be for law
and politics, while still focusing on material goods, to more fully
recognize the marginal utility of such goods. This would mean
trying to ensure that as many people as possible have some
requisite level of certain material goods—rather than trying to
maximize the sum or average. Identifying what goods are requisite,
and at what level, would draw on some version of the capabilities
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approach advocated by Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and
16
others.
I would embrace this partial corrective. But here I want to
suggest that we should do more than identify the basic material
goods requisite to thriving. We should also ask what deeper things
people need. In particular, we should think about whether law and
politics might help us develop the traits, capacities, and attitudes—
the character—that will enable us to thrive. At the very least, we
should consider whether our law and politics may actually be
undercutting the development of the traits, capacities, and
attitudes we most need.
If it seems as though I am calling for something inconsistent
with a core commitment to democracy, recall the document that
launched ours. The Declaration of Independence grounded our
experiment on the claim that people are entitled to three things—
17
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The first of those three,
life, recognizes the material needs we rightly strive to protect. The
second, liberty, highlights the autonomy concerns we must respect
in the process.
But what of the third? What do we mean—what should we
mean—by happiness? And what does it mean that our
commitment is to the pursuit of happiness, rather than to the thing
itself? This framing seems to suggest that it is something we should
facilitate rather than provide; but how? This question we have so
far evaded, as our law and politics have focused to the first two
components of our founding commitment. I suggest that we turn
our attention to the part we forgot.
D. An Unavoidable Problem
It will be objected that liberal democracy avoids the question of
what conduces to human thriving. This objection can be framed in
terms of democratic legitimacy (we must not consider such
matters) or in terms of pragmatic caution (we should not consider
such matters). Either way, the upshot of the objection is that law
and politics should strive only to create the basic conditions
necessary for thriving—material security, for example—and should

16. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, Nature, Functioning and Capability: Aristotle on Political
Distribution, in 6 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 145–184 (Oxford Studies 1988); Amartya Sen,
Capability and Wellbeing, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30–53 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen,
eds., 1993).
17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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take no position at all on further questions of what traits, capacities
and attitudes might help us thrive.
That objection, however, assumes away the key question. It
assumes that we know or agree upon the basic conditions necessary
for human thriving. We do not. We simply act as though we do—
while pretending to take no position on the matter.
In particular, utilitarian approaches to law and politics—
including the entire edifice of law and economics—are grounded
in some account of what conduces to if not constitutes human
thriving. Either that or they are pointless. By way of illustration,
imagine that legal and policy scholars were to devote enormous
effort and resources to figuring out how to make people’s hair
marginally more blonde. That would strike us as silly. Why?
Because we have no reason to believe that making people
marginally blonder will actually make them better off or happier.
So instead scholars devote their energy to figuring out how to
make people marginally richer, safer, healthier, and the like. And
those efforts are not silly at all. Why? Because we assume that those
things are important conditions or components of thriving.
Utilitarian theories are thriving theories; with the caveat that they
assume, rather than defend, the significance for thriving of the
ends they pursue.
Nor can we responsibly dodge the question by simply taking as
our goal the satisfaction of preferences. First of all, to take
preference satisfaction as a goal is to assume that having one’s
preferences satisfied conduces to or constitutes part a good life.
However plausible that theory may be, it manifestly is a theory of
thriving—rather than a way of avoiding the need for such a theory.
And it is probably not a very good theory.
More to the point, preferences are not exogenous. They are
outputs as well as inputs. Law and politics impact what we want,
and we should take responsibility for that impact. To situate the
point within the context of the approach I advocate here,
preferences are aspects of character—the very character that is
inevitably influenced by law and politics. Indeed, in the Socratic
terms to which I will return, the most helpful way to think about
character is in terms of what we desire. If Socrates had it right,
what we learn to want largely determines whether and how well we
thrive. And law and politics at least influence what we want. It is
simply an evasion to suggest that law and politics should limit their
focus to providing people with whatever they already happen to
desire when law and politics are shaping those very desires.
Justice- or fairness-based theories of law and politics might claim
to need no account of thriving, but that too is at least to some
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extent an evasion. To the extent that justice-based arguments focus
on the fair distribution of goods, for example, they make use of
some at least implicit account of what counts as a good. Imagine a
policy providing that members of one group get free health care
while members of another group get free piano lessons, and
members of yet another group get government cheese. Such a
policy would be rightly criticized as not only expressively
problematic and/or inefficient on utilitarian grounds but also as
distributionally unjust. It would be unfair. Why? In part because we
assume that health care is necessary to thriving, while piano
lessons, perhaps conducive to well-being, are not necessary, and
cheese is neither. Or perhaps some would argue that music is more
essential to thriving than health. The point is that there is some
theory of value at work, and any such theory implicitly draws upon
some account of what constitutes or conduces to well-being.
To pretend to take no position on what helps make for a rich
and full life is often simply to deny responsibility for the way we
have implicitly answered it. Some theory of human thriving often—
if not inevitably—informs legal and political discourse and
decision-making. If so, the theory should be a good one—or at
least one we have thought about as well as we can. Otherwise, law
and politics may not only fail to help people thrive; they may
actually make people worse off.
Granted that law and politics inevitably rest on some at least
tentative account of human thriving, it is yet another step to claim
that character ought to be part of the calculus. Perhaps it should
suffice to build on the work of happiness researchers and focus
solely on what sort of external circumstances and conditions best
conduce to well-being. Perhaps it is unnecessary or illegitimate for
law and politics to attend to character—to what sort of people we
are or should be. In particular, it will be objected that concern for
character represents a problematic intrusion on individual
18
autonomy. This is a fair concern, but not a fatal objection.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that arguments about
autonomy can themselves operate as evasions—implicitly assertions
that it is acceptable to do anything we want to people as long as we
get them to agree to it. The use of lotteries to raise public funds
offers an example. Such a highly regressive form of taxation is
defensible only on the basis that people choose to play—as if we
bear no responsibility for the things we manage to persuade

18. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate “Hate Crime Legislation,” 20 L. &
PHIL. 215 (2001).
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people to do. In this way, the freedom that many autonomy-based
arguments seem often to protect is the freedom to exploit
predictable cognitive failures, information asymmetries and the
like for our own benefit.
But granting that respect for real autonomy is both an essential
principle and a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy, it still does
not follow that attention to the traits and capacities indirectly
nurtured by law and politics runs counter to that principle. And
this is true for two reasons.
First, some traits and capacities augment individual autonomy,
but can best or only be nurtured collectively. It does not offend
autonomy for law and politics to take an interest in whether people
get infectious diseases or whether people learn to read. Health and
basic education give people more autonomy. And given that those
and similar matters are inevitably impacted by public policy, it
would be an evasion for law and politics to adopt a willful blindness
to the impact they have. Similarly, some traits and capacities
enhance people’s ability to make and follow through on
autonomous choices about how to live and thrive. A real respect
for real autonomy and freedom calls for the nurturing of such
traits—and for a reluctance to inadvertently nurture traits that
limit and enslave.
Second, some traits are useful or even necessary to maintaining
the very democracy that in turn makes real autonomy possible. We
have long recognized that it is legitimate and consistent with a
commitment to individual autonomy for democratic law and
politics to impose limits on conduct—even demand certain
conduct—where necessary or important to preserve the very system
that protects that autonomy. So too is it legitimate to nurture the
traits and capacities that are similarly necessary or important. This
is especially true where the traits and capacities we nurture also
themselves directly augment individual autonomy.
Of course, law and politics are not the only or even the main
things that make us the sort of people we are. Culture, family,
community life, even marketing all may have a larger effect on who
we are. But law and politics matter. And, of course, character is not
the only thing that impacts thriving. Basic material needs—safety,
health, economic security, and the like—certainly matter; and
people also need a sense of meaning and purpose. I will suggest
that a certain way of thinking about character may also help
address these other needs. For now, however, the key point is that

19. See, e.g., Rick Wolff, Lotteries as Disguised, Regressive, and Counterproductive Taxes, 9
INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION 136, 139 (2011).
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law and politics help make us who we are, and that who we are
plays at least some role in how well we live. If so, to ignore the
impact that law and politics have on character—and thus on
whether and how we thrive—is simply an evasion and a denial of
responsibility.
II. HOW LAW IMPACTS CHARACTER
As Plato and Aristotle both point out, our character is shaped by
both what we do and the environment in which we do what we do;
and law and politics inevitably influence both. Any political or legal
system will influence what we do, even if just by forbidding certain
conduct—or indeed even by deciding not to forbid anything at all.
And any legal or political system will influence the environment in
which we do what we do. On this score, a libertarian or minimalist
political system creates a particular environment just as much as a
paternalistic or interventionist system does. There is no such thing
as a legal/political system that does not influence what we do or
the environment in which we do it; thus, there is no such thing as
law and politics that do not at least potentially influence our
character. The question is how. Beyond the direct regulation of
specific conduct and the creation of the general background
environment in which we live and act, how might law and politics
influence our character?
Here I suggest eight potential mechanisms. This part of my
argument is inevitably incomplete. Thinking about the myriad and
subtle ways law and politics may help shape character is a central
aspect of the ongoing project for which I am calling in this
Article—not something I can nail down here. I can, however,
illustrate the sort of thing I mean. To this end, here are eight
overlapping ways in which law and politics, whether intentionally
or inadvertently, may have an influence on the sorts of people we
become. The labels we might give these various and interrelated
mechanisms, and the distinctions between them, are somewhat
arbitrary; but the following descriptive terms will suffice: 1)
exhortation; 2) cultivation; 3) argument; 4) discouraging
debasement; 5) expression; 6) nurturing institutions; 7) enabling
exemplars; and 8) providing proxies for conversation.
A. Exhortation
Most obviously, law and politics might be vehicles through which
we directly exhort ourselves to certain traits. Think of Roosevelt
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calling for courage or Kennedy calling for a spirit of public service.
However, without dismissing the possibility that particularly
charismatic leaders might directly inspire virtue, this sort of overt
inculcation of character is not my primary concern here. As I will
suggest below, rhetoric matters a great deal to character formation,
but indirectly; so direct hortatory exhortation is not likely to be the
most important way law and politics influence who we are. It is also
not the most dangerous. Direct and overt efforts to nurture
character are evident for what they are, and can be embraced,
rejected, or ignored as we choose. What need attention are the
indirect ways in which law and politics may make us who we are.
B. Cultivation
Law can influence character indirectly, by encouraging or
discouraging conduct that might indirectly cultivate particular
traits. Someone trying to lose weight and get in shape might
intentionally park farther from his or her workplace. Or, a baseball
player might avoid playing slow-pitch softball out of concern that
adjusting his swing to hit lobbed softball pitches will throw off his
mechanics. We recognize, and thus can either make use of or
guard against, the possibility that the demands we put on ourselves
physically may have indirect consequences, good or bad, for our
bodies. We can and should do the same thing for our souls. We
should be aware of the indirect impact on our character of what we
allow or require ourselves to do—of how we regulate our lives.
One obvious example would be integration or antidiscrimination law. We might hope that integrated and diverse
institutions will allow or require us to interact with others from
different backgrounds and thus indirectly help us develop
desirable traits of tolerance or open-mindedness—or that
requiring ourselves to work with others with varying viewpoints will
help us develop the wisdom that comes through seeing things from
different perspectives. Similarly, we might regulate pornography
and/or prostitution not just to protect from harm those directly
impacted, and not just to express our normative views about
pornography, but also to avoid engendering in ourselves the trait
of misogyny, which we think might come about through
participation in, or exposure to the systematic exploitation of
20
women and girls.

20.

See, e.g., Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution?, 99 ETHICS 347 (1989).
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And the indirect effects may be subtler still. Consider the
constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Most
obviously, this protects those who would be the object of such
punishment; but we might also eschew cruelty because of what it
does to us. Engaging in behavior we feel to be cruel and unusual
may, for example, encourage or even require us to distance
ourselves from our actions—to reduce our willingness to see
ourselves in what we do. If so, it may indirectly undercut the
capacity for self-reflection arguably critical to the development of
other virtues.
Perhaps the most well-known argument about the potential
effect of legal doctrine on character was that made by Warren and
Brandeis in their argument that law should discourage invasive
gossip mongering:
Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the
suffering of those who may be the subjects of journalistic or
other enterprise. . . . Even gossip apparently harmless,
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It
both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the
relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts
and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains
the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for
matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that
the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative
importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that
weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down
by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one
can be surprised that it usurps the place of interest in
brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once
robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No
enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive
21
under its blighting influence.
My point in quoting Warren and Brandeis at such length is
obviously not to argue for a right to privacy, nor even to endorse
the underlying claim about the corrupting nature of gossip. The
point is simply that they knew how to and were willing to talk about
the consequences of law for the sort of people we become.
Just as how what we do impacts our character, so too does how
we do it. In particular, the ways in which we go about making

21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 196
(1890).
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salient decisions may have as much impact on who we are as what
we decide. By way of illustration, consider why parents might
choose to involve children in discussions of family decisions. They
might do so in part to develop in the children a capacity for
deliberation of decision-making, or to nurture a sense of shared
responsibility. Nor does the principle depend on infantilizing or
disrespecting those in whom one might want to nurture traits. A
law faculty, for example, might choose methods of deliberation
and decision-making not solely in order to get things done
efficiently or even decided as well as possible, but also in an effort
to cultivate in ourselves a sense of community, shared
responsibility, mutual respect, and the capacity for the collective
articulation of mission and purpose. Mine does.
The clearest example of this principle at work in American law
and politics may be the use of juries. It has long been recognized
22
that jury service may play an educative role. I suggest as well that
jury service may, despite is relative rarity, nurture important traits
and capacities. Jury service, in particular in criminal trials, requires
jurors to bear a certain sort of moral weight and responsibility.
And, as athletes recognize in the context of physical capacities, the
burdens we require ourselves to bear can help us build the
strengths we need. As I have suggested, jury service, properly
structured and conceived, may build traits of responsibility taking,
23
empathy, and the capacity for deliberation.
I say “properly structured and conceived,” and there’s the rub.
Once we have recognized the potential character-building effects
of legal and political processes, we can better think about whether
and how to structure and conceive of those processes so as to meet
those ends—while of course still serving the essential
consequentialist decision-making function of the process in
question.
This matters because an institution or process that might
otherwise nurture desirable traits might, if arranged and
understood without attention to such matters, actually undercut
important virtues. The institutions of democratic political
participation, for example, may in many cases nurture desirable
personal and civic virtues. But they can do the opposite. As I have
argued elsewhere, direct democracy, which is often defended as
form edifying civic participation, may actually nurture

22. E.g., Andrew G. Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 U. COLO. L.
REV. 233 (2013).
23. See generally Clark, supra note 1; Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97
MICH. L. REV. 8 (1999).
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irresponsibility, selfishness, and narrow decision-making. It does
so, arguably, by encouraging voters to exercise power over others
without confronting their own responsibility for those exercises of
power, and by fostering and reifying a notion of political
participation as the mere assertion of preferences.
C. Argument
More subtly still, we become who we are not just through what
we do, but also through how we understand and justify our
conduct. An obvious example would be the use of dehumanizing
rhetoric in war. But other less-obviously problematic ways of talking
and thinking also can be constitutive, and potentially corrupting.
Well-intentioned, seemingly uncontroversial, and ostensibly
neutral ways of talking and thinking about law and politics
potentially undercut the very thriving law and politics are
presumably intended to make possible.
I have explored this potential dynamic at some length in other
25
work; so here let me just highlight the central point. When we
persuade, we do so not through the force of abstract logic but by
finding or making space in the worldviews—the understanding,
and priorities—of those we persuade. Unless we believe that the
understandings and priorities of those we persuade are fixed, we
should recognize that when we persuade we do not simply find
but, crucially, sometimes also may make space in their worldviews.
If so, we should take responsibility not just for what we persuade
people to do but also for what we do to those we persuade.
Imagine that as a lawyer or legislator or political candidate you
could advance a useful project if you were to make arguments that
appeal to racism and fear. Perhaps you want to build a new school
that will serve the less advantaged children in your city; and you
recognize that you could win support for the project if you subtly
emphasize that having a new school will keep those (black) kids
from having to travel across town to attend your (white) school.
Granted, a heavy-handed argument might well backfire, and thus
be bad argumentative strategy. But you might well hesitate to make
this argument even if you think it would work. And you might
hesitate not only because the argument is distasteful, but also
because you would recognize that by appealing to racism and fear

24.
25.

Clark, supra note 2.
Clark, supra note 4.
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you would not just be pandering to those things. You would be
26
helping to construct them in your community.
Appeals to racism and fear, however, are too obvious as
illustrations. The troubling reality is that the impact of rhetoric
may be less obvious, and thus disregarded. It is easy to see that
Donald Trump’s rhetoric does not just pander to xenophobia—it
fuels it. And it is equally clear that Lincoln’s Second Inaugural did
not just appeal to the better angels of our nature—it nurtured
them. For those of us who are neither Lincoln nor Trump, the
constitutive impact of any one speech or argument is likely to be
small and at the margins. We won’t see it. But invisible increments
27
add up.
A less obvious example would be the extent and insistence with
which our arguments focus on marginal increases in wealth or
material comfort or safety. Those arguments are not obviously
destructive. But nor should we be surprised if—after relying on
such arguments to the exclusion of others—we find ourselves in a
society so focused on those things that we are less capable of
sustaining public conversation about other things that matter
more. We are reaping what we—in part through our ways of
speaking and arguing—have sown.
D. Discouraging Debasement
Marketers want to sell us things; and they are willing to debase
us to get us to buy. They do not think in terms of debasement, of
course. They just appeal, with great sophistication, to what works—
whether that means appealing to our vanity, greed, fear, or
whatever. But in light of the insight described above, that is a
problem. If indeed we nurture those traits to which we appeal,
marketing may be making us more vain, greedy, and fearful. As
with political and legal rhetoric, the impact of any one
advertisement will be insignificant, marginal. But ads add up.
Advertisers know that “People Don’t Buy Products, They Buy
28
Better Versions of Themselves.” They know they are selling us a
set of traits—a way of seeing and thinking of ourselves. And they
do not care whether that way is good for us. Granted, it might be
possible to sell some sorts of things by appealing to and thus
26. For a detailed discussion of the impact of public language on character and
conduct, see JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS (2015), especially Chapter 4.
27. See id.
28. Zander Nethercutt, People Don’t Buy Products, They Buy Better Versions of Themselves,
MEDIUM (July 7, 2018), https://medium.com/s/buy-yourself/people-dont-buy-productsthey-buy-better-versions-of-themselves-d481390bfcee.
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nurturing useful traits. But many of the things we might buy are
appealing to our desires for pleasure or status. To anticipate the
Socratic account of virtues described below, a desire for pleasure
and a desire for status are arguably the very attitudes we should
strive not to nurture. But those are the attitudes marketers often
must appeal to—and thus potentially cultivate—if they are to get us
to buy.
Law and politics might mitigate the ability of marketers to
debase us. While content restrictions based on potential
debasement would be difficult to sustain against a First
Amendment challenge, other measures might be possible.
Commercial speech may constitutionally be regulated by means
29
that are reasonable in light of a legitimate state interest. Time,
place and manner restrictions could thus limit the reach and scope
of ads—if not their content. We ban cigarette ads on TV to limit
the ability of tobacco companies to exploit our addictive
tendencies and poison our lungs. Might we not at least curtail
other sorts of ads to prevent other sorts of marketers from
exploiting our deeper cognitive biases and poisoning our souls?
E. Expression
Recent decades have seen a number of what are referred to as
expressive theories of law and politics, the common thread in
which is that it not only matters what law does but also what it
30
says. What is not addressed, however, is just why it matters what
law says. There are a number of potential good answers to this
question. Law can, for example, express and thus help construct
substantive norms of conduct. In this way, criminal law not only
deters, protects against, and punishes certain conduct; it can also
communicate that certain conduct is considered wrong or
unacceptable. Expression through law can also be seen as
important for its own sake, or because it can communicate and

29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 337 U.S. 557, 569–70
(1980) (explaining that the content of non-misleading commercial speech can be
constitutionally regulated when a substantial government interest is at stake, the regulation
directly advances that interest, and the regulation is no more extensive than necessary). But
see Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (clarifying the test by holding that only a
“reasonable fit” must be necessary between the state interest and the regulation).
30. For the first prominent defense of such expressive theories, see Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965). For later defenses of it see, e.g., Igor
Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 PHIL. 187 (1989); R.A. Duff, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 27–30 (2001); Chris Bennett, State Denunciation of Crime,
3 J. MORAL PHIL. 288 (2006).
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thus construct values important for their own sake. In this way, we
might aim to express, through law, respect for equality and dignity;
and we might seek to avoid expressing disrespect or intolerance.
I suggest here that an additional reason expression matters is
that it can articulate and thus encourage the formation of
character. And it can do so in much the same way as the persuasive
rhetoric described above. One way people figure out who to be
and how to live is by noticing what traits and ways of being are
described and lauded by others in their community—and by their
community itself. This can happen at a personal level, when people
we respect express views about desirable and undesirable traits. As
a teenager, I happened to overhear my father speak disdainfully of
men who treat women poorly. That expression, along with my
desire to be respected by a man I respected, had more impact on
my own attitudes—and on my own unwillingness to admit
misogyny into my character—than could any combination of direct
exhortation, philosophical argument, or material incentives.
Similarly, when law expresses, directly or indirectly, admiration or
respect for certain ways of being, that can—if the law and its
expressions are worthy of respect—encourage the development of
the traits it has extolled.
Tort law, for example, can express the value of mutual respect
for equal dignity. It does so through particular so-called dignitary
32
harms, but also more generally simply by empowering people to
demand that others be called to account for mistreatment. Tort
law primarily protects and empowers victims, of course, but it also
works on all of us—indirectly communicating that respect for the
rights and interests of others is an admirable trait and an essential
component of democratic citizenship.
More indirectly still, particular aspects of doctrine may
communicate something similar. Consider the objective standard
for negligence in tort. That can certainly be described and
defended as a matter of pragmatic necessity, or simply flowing
from the internal logic of the negligence principle. But it also
expresses something. It expresses the view—arguably at the heart
of not just tort law but of democracy itself—that everyone deserves
to be treated as equally competent citizens. A similar message may
be expressed by the processes employed by law and politics, such as
the use of juries, and indeed the various institutions of democracy

31. For an influential example of this approach see Jean Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208 (1984).
32. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 553–54 (1872) (illustrating that spitting in
someone’s face, while not causing physical injury, has long been recognized as an affront to
dignity worthy of legal response under the heading of offensive battery).
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itself. How well or fully our institutions currently express such
visions of respect and equality is a separate and significant
question—one beyond the scope of this Article. The point here is
that decision-making processes may often, albeit implicitly, be
understood to say something about how much we respect the
people who do or do not get to make decisions.
F. Nurturing Seedbeds
Law and politics can also influence character by encouraging or
facilitating the development of other institutions through which
traits are articulated or developed. For example, law can facilitate,
or inhibit, the development of philanthropic, fraternal, or religious
institutions through which individuals and groups construct and
33
pursue visions of themselves. More subtly, zoning regulations and
land use policies can influence the shape of our communities, thus
making it easier or more difficult for people to live and work
together in ways conducive to the development of character trait
such as cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility, as
opposed to isolated individualism or gated us-versus-them ways of
conceiving of public life.
But civic virtue or public-spiritedness is of course not the only
character trait that might be articulated or constructed through
institutions which law or politics might or might not in turn
encourage or facilitate. Most salient—at least on the tentative
Socratic account of valuable virtues sketched below—educational
and artistic institutions might nurture a love of truth and beauty.
Military organizations might help people construct and aspire to
courage and loyalty. Educational institutions might nurture a love
of truth. Religious organizations might help articulate and provide
an arena for the development of temperance or spirituality.
Sporting organizations may offer vehicles through which people
understand and develop traits of persistence, toughness, or
teamwork. Fraternal organizations often self-consciously define
themselves as instruments for the construction of visions of
manhood, responsibility, and/or charity.
Nor, however, is it all necessarily for good. Military and sporting
organizations can under some circumstances become arenas for
the development of traits of violence or misogyny. Religious and
fraternal organizations can foster intolerance or provincialism.

33. For example, the government might fund some such activities and/or grant some
such organizations tax exempt status.
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My point, therefore, is not to advocate for support of any
particular institution, but rather to suggest that when we decide
what public policy choices to make, we should do so with an
awareness of how those choices will influence our character. In
particular, we should think about whether those choices will
facilitate or undercut the institutions through which we articulate
or develop our sense of who we are. If we, for example, decide how
to regulate or tax fraternal organizations, or how to control land
use, or whether to fund a sports leagues or stadiums, based entirely
on the measurable economic consequences, or in terms of
aggregating preferences, we will be missing much of what matters.
The institutions we build or encourage do not just help us get what
we want; they are also the arenas in which we learn how to be.
G. Proxies for Conversation
Law and politics are not merely vehicles through which we may
nurture pre-defined or agreed-upon character traits. They are fora
through which we understand and construct them. Our law and
politics do not merely help or hinder us from being the sort of
people we want; they help us figure out who we want to be. It is
possible, of course, to engage in theoretical discussion of the
virtues—to analyze and argue about what forms of what virtues are
desirable and why, given various views of what it means to thrive. I
engage in some of that below.
Legal and political issues also provide concrete contexts for
defining and discussing character. Consider guns, for example. As
Dan Kahan and Donald Braman have shown, American’s views
over gun control are determined largely by what they call cultural
34
values. People make arguments about safety, or the text of the
Second Amendment; and they are not necessarily disingenuous in
doing so; but what seems really to drive views on the issue are a
deeper and perhaps unexamined set of ideals about what guns
35
mean, and what it would mean to regulate them.
But what Kahan and Braman describe are not merely competing
views of what is right, but also accounts of arguably admirable
character traits—self-reliance and courage and independence on
the part of gun rights advocates competing with non-violence and
shared community responsibility on the part of gun control

34. Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control,
and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L. J. 569, 571 (2006).
35. Id.
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advocates, for example. Nor is it merely that views on the issue are
informed by competing visions of community character.
Rather, community character is the issue, with gun control
serving as a vehicle or proxy for a conversation we could not have,
or not have as well, in the abstract. If so, we should help people
articulate those concerns, flesh them out, and think well about the
connections between various accounts of identity and character
and various visions of individual or collective thriving. The
concrete issue can provide the grounding and context necessary
for a richer conversation about what kind of people we want to be.
H. Enabling Exemplars
Even with the benefit of the concrete contexts provided by law
and politics, it remains difficult to talk well about character traits
and their impact on thriving. It can be rather like trying to choose
or design clothes by arguing about what they will look like. Often it
can be helpful to have someone wear the clothes for us—model
them for us. And it can be especially helpful when people model
clothes that we would not have had the creativity to imagine or
design from scratch.
So, rather than merely defining virtues in the abstract, we
construct them in part through molds and models. A person says
to himself or herself: I want to be brave like my father, wise like my
teacher, tough like my coach. Or, alternatively: I do not want to be
weak or foolish or irresponsible like X, and Y, and Z. We also use
famous people, or what we think we know of them, to embody
traits to which we aspire or which we hope to eschew. The point
here is not just that these people represent traits of character in our
imagination. More than that, they are also the vessels through
which we construct those traits. We do not have some agreed-upon
and clear idea of courage or wisdom, which a father or teacher
them comes to stand for in our minds, or an unambiguous picture
of greed or materialism, for which a particular villain, real or
fictional, becomes a shorthand. Those people are the ways in
which we come to conceive of those ways of being.
So, what does law have to do with this process? Directly, not
much; but indirectly perhaps a great deal, by providing, or
undercutting, conditions under which those who might exemplify
character traits can thrive and inspire emulation. While law and
politics can overtly and intentionally create opportunities for

36.

Id. at 577–79.
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and/or celebrate role models and heroes—such as in the context
of military or other public service; the subtler effects are again
likely to be equally significant.
Consider Title IX, for example, as applied to college athletics.
On its face, Title IX is a straightforward anti-discrimination statute,
modeled after Title VI and Title VII, prohibiting discrimination in
37
education on the basis of sex. I suggest that there is something
missing from the debate over Title IX. Title IX is also, albeit
indirectly, about character. Most obviously, again, antidiscrimination law can express a commitment to a particular vision
of fairness; and Title IX may do that. But that is not my point here.
Here, I am looking to Title IX as one of the ways in which law can
facilitate the flourishing of exemplars though which we can
understand and aspire to traits of character. Title IX does not just
help the women and girls who gain opportunities thereby. It helps
us all. By encouraging and allowing women and girls to excel in
sports at the highest and highest profile levels, it provides us with
more and better heroes.
We do not look for every virtue in or through athletes. Wisdom
and temperance, for example, are not necessarily traits we
associate with or look for in young athletic heroes. We do,
however, look to them to help us imagine a set of traits including
perseverance, toughness, teamwork, and the like. But we can do
that well or poorly. Given a limited set of models, we might, for
example, come to see the virtues of endurance, perseverance,
strength, and the like as associated with, even inevitably tied to
other, less desirable traits such as a tendency to violence or
disrespect for women. Boys will be boys, as we say—but only if they
are always boys. We associate these sorry traits with the admirable
ones, and thus have a lesser picture of what it is possible to be, in
part because we see the relevant virtues always or often modeled by
a particular and narrow set of exemplars—men and boys. If we had
more women and girls among our athletic heroes, perhaps we
could see these traits better, develop a richer conception of them,
imagine ways in which they need not be understood as tied to
other less desirable traits often found in young men. Our very
conception of virtues can be richer or more impoverished
depending on the vessels through which we conceive of them.
Nor is Title IX the only possible example. Many areas of law are
likely to have some impact, direct or indirect, on whether those
who might embody and help us construct richer versions of virtues
can thrive and do so. Intellectual property law, for example, does

37.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018).
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not merely encourage invention and creative works, but can also
nurture exemplars of ingenuity and creativity. Tax and antitrust
and corporate law help determine the extent to which small
business people can thrive and inspire emulation of
entrepreneurial virtues. Immigration law can broaden or narrow
our sense of possible ways of being by allowing for or inhibiting the
flourishing of those who might help us see or construct those ways.
Policies encouraging diversity in educational institutions can serve
a similar role.
I. What Follows?
In the eight overlapping ways described above (and perhaps in
other ways as well), rules and practices designed primarily to serve
utilitarian or deontological ends can also indirectly impact
character. Indeed, some such impact is likely to be inevitable. So
we should—in ways consistent with other ends—craft doctrine,
structure process, and conduct conversation with those constitutive
consequences in mind.
Of course, by framing the matter at that level of generality, I
have rather elided the most difficult but essential question. What
character traits should we seek to nurture? I am tempted to demur,
given that my primary aim in this Article is simply to highlight and
call for attention to some of the ways in which law may construct
various traits or capacities. That itself is an important conversation;
but we cannot continue at that level indefinitely. We need to be
willing to make, and listen to, arguments about the particular ways
of being to which we ought to aspire if we hope to thrive. So it is as
much in the spirit of illustration as argument that below I highlight
one possible—and I think compelling—Socratic account of
account of how we might strive to be if we hope to thrive.
III. HOW CHARACTER IMPACTS THRIVING
There are any number of ways to think and talk about character.
For example, it is common and in some contexts useful to think of
character primarily in terms of conduct and define character traits
in Aristotelian terms as persistent habits of action. 38 On that way of
thinking, courage, for example, is simply the persistent tendency to
39
behave bravely in the face of danger.
38.
39.

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 25–28 (W. D. Ross trans., Batoche Books 1999).
Id. at 43–49.

WINTER 2019]

The City and the Soul

441

Both classical and modern thinking about character, however,
have found it illuminating to focus on internal attitudes, and
motivations. On this way of thinking, courage is better understood
as a certain stance or orientation toward danger. This is the
approach I take here. Following the account offered by Socrates in
Plato’s Republic, I suggest that a particularly useful way to think
about character—at least in its connection with thriving—is not so
much in terms of what we do, but more essentially in terms of what
40
we think, and in particular, what we desire.
Along those lines, I suggest that law and politics might best try to
help us nurture or retain eight particular virtues. This is not an
exhaustive list, or even a list of the traits one might consider most
conducive to thriving in general. For example, not included in my
list are grit (which seems to be much favored by a certain school of
thought lately), or charity (although I do believe some of the traits
I highlight would conduce to charitable conduct). I aim here to
identify traits that seem to me particularly important to thriving (at
least on the tentative Socratic account which grounds my
thinking), and particularly important in a democracy. These traits
are also, I believe, susceptible to being nurtured indirectly through
law and politics, and are of a sort that enhance, rather than
undercut, the autonomy of citizens.
I would highlight identify eight such traits, divided into two
parallel groups of four.
The first four are perhaps not of primary importance to
individual thriving, but flow from the account described above and
are arguably particularly important public virtues in a democracy.
These first four are: 1) a sense of shared responsibility, for which one
might well use the more common term civic virtue; 2) self-restraint,
to counteract the tendency of democratic free market society (and
the marketers who profit in it) to encourage futile self-indulgence;
3) intellectual humility to foster the authentic engagement necessary
to democratic deliberation and decision-making; and 4) fellowfeeling, by which awkward term I mean the capacity to recognize
not just our shared responsibility but also our shared humanity.
To these I would add four more—variations on the above. These
next four are inward-looking versions to the classical virtues.
Collectively, they embody the classical Socratic account of
character and thriving offered above and are more directly focused
on individual thriving than on community life. That said, as they
all arguably augment, rather than restrict, real autonomy, it would

40.

Plato, supra note 10, at 262–64.
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not offend principles of autonomy for law and politics to engage in
the partially-paternalistic effort to nurture these traits.
The four internal analogs to the classical virtues are: 1) a form of
internal courage, understood as internal responsibility taking—the
willingness to acknowledge our agency in what we do; 2) a form of
temperance, understood as freedom from slavery to pleasure or
praise; 3) a form of wisdom, understood as love of knowledge or
truth or; and 4) something corresponding to piety, for which I use
the term aspiration, understood as the willingness and ability to
reach for things we cannot quite grasp.
I have in other work started to explore, explain, and defend the
41
importance of these particular traits; but this Article is not the
place to attempt a thorough theory of character and thriving—
even if it were within my capacity to do so. Indeed, such an effort
here would misrepresent and distract from the aim of this Article,
which is that law and politics should attend to these questions, not
that I have answered them.
I can, however, at least be explicit about the Socratic perspective
on character and thriving that underpins the tentative list of traits I
suggest might be usefully and legitimately cultivated by law and
politics. That will, I trust, be controversial enough, and will serve to
illustrate the sort of inquiry for which I am calling.
A. A Socratic Account of Character: What We Desire
Plato’s Republic, nominally an extensive dialogue on the
particular virtue of justice, in fact offers a broader theory of
character and human thriving. It does so, moreover, through the
lens of community life, and thus provides a template for thinking
about not only which traits we might hope to cultivate, but as well
about the role law and politics might play in cultivating them. I
describe it as a Socratic, rather than Platonic, account because my
emphasis here is on the framework established by the character
Socrates in the early books, rather than on the some of the
elaborate doctrines—including the doctrine of the forms—which
have always struck me as places where Plato’s desire to expound his
own metaphysics rather overwhelmed his fidelity to the character
and vision of his teacher Socrates.
But to whomever we attribute the insights contained therein, the
first and crucial step in looking to The Republic to think about law
and politics is to recognize that The Republic is not essentially a

41.

See Clark, supra notes 1–5.
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book about law and politics. It is a book about the soul. The
Republic uses the construction of a highly artificial and
impracticable (even undesirable) city/state as a lens through
which to think about the individual. Socrates makes this absolutely
42
explicit in Book 2.
Socrates describes three elements of the community, defined by
what they each desire, and corresponding to aspects within each
43
individual. This Socratic geography of the soul is not meant to be
a literal psychology. It is a way of thinking about character—useful
because it focuses our attention not just on what we do but what we
seek. Specifically, it asks us to think about who we are in terms of
our aspirations—by thinking carefully about where we set our
44
sights.
In Socrates’ imagined city, the most numerous and naturally
powerful segment of the community is made up of those who
desire and seek pleasure—whether in the form of physical
45
gratification or material goods. If that element is allowed to rule,
Socrates argues, the city will not thrive. They provide the energy,
the might, and the productive force of the community. But they
46
cannot and should not govern the whole. So too for the
individual. We each have within us a part of ourselves that desires
pleasure and comfort. This, Socrates suggests, is naturally the
strongest or at least most forceful element in each of us. This is the
part that is prone to fall into the belief that more stuff will make us
happy. This part is neither wise nor thoughtful enough to see the
way in which things recede, and therefore will, if allowed to govern
our souls, have us blindly chasing one pleasure after another, one
47
possession after the next.
The second element of the city described by Socrates is made up
48
of those who desire and seek honor. Fewer in number but strong,
they provide protection and security. Placing honor above comfort
or safety, they can be brought to place the city’s safety above their
own. This class is essential—necessary to protect the city from both
outside threats and from the restless thoughtless hunger of the
49
pleasure-seeking masses. But they cannot govern the whole any
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more than can the pleasure seeking many. So too, Socrates
suggests, do we each have within us a part that loves honor. We
should cultivate this part, and train it to our use. Like a good and
loyal dog, this part of the soul can protect us—both from others
and from ourselves. It can enable us to rise above pleasure and
fear. But nor can this part be permitted to govern the soul, because
honor is ultimately no more capable of bringing sustained wellbeing than is pleasure. Should this part be permitted to govern, we
would simply trade the fruitless pursuit of pleasure for the equally
51
fruitless hunger for praise.
Socrates famously concludes that the city will not thrive—will see
no end of evils—unless governed by the third and least numerous
52
element—philosophers. By philosophers, however, he does not
mean professional theorists, nor even merely those who possess
prudence. He means philosophia—the love of knowledge and truth.
Those who ultimately govern, whose aspirations set the course of
the city, must be those who love not pleasure or praise but
53
knowledge—those who seek truth and comprehension. Again,
the analogy to the soul is clear. If we hope to thrive as human
beings, we need to find within ourselves that part which loves
knowledge. We need somehow to cultivate that part, educate it,
protect it. And above all we need to find a way to put that part of
54
ourselves in charge.
How should we understand and to what extent should we
embrace the Socratic claim that wisdom, understood in this way as
the love of truth, is central to thriving? That is the core of the
matter, really. For now, it is enough to say that the upshot of my
argument is manifestly not that philosophers should make our laws.
Rather, we should look to our laws to help us retain, or at least not
undercut, our capacity to be true philosophers—to love something
like knowledge and truth more than pleasure or praise. I say
“something like” knowledge and truth because in a pluralist free
society, the Socratic love of knowledge must at best serve as a placeholder for an entire range of higher aspirations. Obviously, if any
useful talk about human thriving were to require us first to agree
on a precise account of the ultimate good, we would be stuck.
Fortunately, a place-holder will suffice. We need not nail down
the precise nature of the good we should seek before we can begin
thinking about how to help ourselves and one another continue
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seeking it. Leaving L.A. for New York on a cross-country car trip,
fellow-travelers can cover a lot of ground before having to agree
whether Brooklyn or The Bronx will be the ultimate destination.
The varied accounts of the higher and better good similarly seem
to lie in the same direction. In particular, we can agree that
neither pleasure nor praise will suffice. That alone is enough to get
us headed in the right direction. Couple that with the tentative
corollary that the something more we need is something analogous
to or at least intimated by ideas such as love of knowledge, truth,
and beauty, and we have enough to get us well along the road. If
so, if the Socratic account is right and appealing in the direction it
points, if not in every particular, then the eight traits I described
above would seem to be particularly conducive to thriving.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, return to the last of the eight traits briefly
cataloged above—the trait for which I have used the term
“aspiration.” Of the traits I have attempted, here and elsewhere, to
describe, that is the most difficult to define. But it is, I believe,
crucial. The label—”aspiration”—is imperfect, with its unfortunate
connotation of ambition or goal-setting. I would simply use the
classical term piety, but the modern connotations of formal
religiosity and weak or thoughtless devotion are misleading.
I mean instead a kind of strength—the capacity and courage to
keep our eyes not just on but above the bottom line and out of the
mud. It is the ability and willingness to care about and strive for
things deeper and beyond those we can define clearly or measure
with precision. This is, I argue, an essential vehicle for, and
element of, human thriving; and we should guard against the
possibility that our law and politics, including the ways in which we
talk about and teach and justify what we do, may be diminishing
this crucial capacity by turning us into the sort of people who
believe, or behave as though we believe, that more safety, health,
prosperity, or prestige will make us happy.

